Probably the best way to summarize the influences which have operated in the history of embryology is to concentrate attention on what may be called, borrowing a phrase from general-physiology, the "limiting factors" of advance. We may thus regard the progress of knowledge about generation as governed by a reaction-chain, one link of which may at any given time be slower than all the others, and hence may set the speed for the whole. Of these limiting factors the first which may be mentioned (though I do not wish to pronounce here upon their relative importance) is the relation of investigators to their environment. The Carlylean tendency to regard the history of science as a succession of inexplicable geniuses arbitrarily bestowing knowledge upon mankind has now been generally given up as quite mythological. A scientific worker is necessarily the child of his time and the inheritor of the thought of many generations. But the study of his environment and its conditioning power may be carried on from more than one point of view. A sharp distinction is made by the culture-his-
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The Rococo period, it is said, brought in new movements towards freedom in the political sphere, and this took the form in science of a return to empiricism, so that the biological observations of Redi and Wolff were as much connected with the romantic movement as were the philosophical speculations of Rousseau. In the Encyclopedists, the connection between empiricism in science and political freedom is particularly well seen. But when it is suggested* that the new eminence of the female sex in the Rococo period, unimaginable to previous ages, was connected with the temporary triumph of ovism, the reader may question whether the Spenglerian method is not being carried too far.
The social and political ruling ideas of a distinguishable epoch would then, on this view, play an overwhelmingly large part in the scientific thought of the time, and would act as limiting factors to further advance. In so far as we may justifiably argue that the political absolutism of the Baroque period mirrored itself in the extreme rationalism of seventeenth-century biology, this contention is true. But how far can we justifiably argue in this way? The method involves far-reaching analogies at every step, and can hardly be acquitted of many unproved assumptions.
The other principal point of view which may be taken regarding the environment of the scientific worker as a limiting factor is that which emphasizes his existence as an economic unit and seeks to show how his position in a society with such and such a classstructure influences the development of his thought. It seems to offer more chance than the preceding theory for new discoveries in the history of science, for it directs its attention precisely upon those aspects of human society (technical achievement, labour conditions, the everyday life of the mine, the factory, the barber-surgeon's * Bilikiewicz, p. 73. "Die Frau habe heute nicht nur das Recht, dass ihre Sch6nheit und Weiblichkeit in Dithyramben besungen werde; wenn sie den Platz auf dem Throne einnehmen oder ulber Throne verfiugen konne, oder wenn sie im allgemeingesellschaftlichen Leben mit der wachsenden Gleichberechtigung immer verantwortlichere Rollen iibernehmen konne, so habe sie auch das Recht, auf dem Gebiete der Embryologie dem mannlichen Geschlechte in die Augen zu schauen als ein Wesen, das dieselben Rechte auf Freiheit habe. Der Ovismus liess diese Standarte wehen." shop) which, precisely because of their assumed inferiority, have not been incorporated in the majority of books, written inevitably by members of the governing classes or by those who aspired to imitate gentility. Thus the rather sharp cleavage between the philosophic biologist of the Hellenistic age, and the contemporary medical man, who might often be a slave, contributed doubtless to the sterility of ancient Mediterranean medicine, induding obstetrics and gynxcology. In the later Christian West there was not much incentive to embryological study so long as the process of childbirth was left to the charms and incantations of barbarous midwives. But for a better insight into the economic position of embryologists in past ages nearly all the work remains to be done.
One necessity must constantly be kept before the mind's eye, namely, the knowledge of the relations between scientific thought and technical practice at any given period. For embryology this knowledge is difficult to acquire, since up to the time of the Renaissance obstetrics remained a part of primitive folk-medicine rather than of serious medical science. We see, however, in the publication of the Hellenistic gynxcological treatises in the sixteenth century (Bauhin, Spach) the satisfaction of a new demand, even though it took the typical Renaissance form of what might be called palxolatry. It was part of that movement to rationalize obstetrics which included Harvey's De Generatione and Malpighi's De Formatione Pulli and culminated in the celebrated man-midwives of the eighteenth century.* Again, the relation of the early systematistsBelon, Rondelet, Aldrovandus, Ray-to the beginnings of capitalist expansion is fairly clear, for the medimval bestiary could not cope with the influx of new animals and plants from hitherto unknown regions, any one of which might prove to be an exploitable commodity.
The Hellenistic divorce between scientific thought and empirical technique is an important case in point. Greek life was divided strictly into 0ecpCa and irpagys. The latter was not thought fitting for a man of good birth. "Antiquity," says Diels, "was entirely aristocratic in attitude. Even prominent artists, such as Pheidias, were classed as artisans, and were incapable of bursting through the barrier separating the workers and peasants from the upper dass. A second cause of the slight technical progress in antiquity was its slave-holding system, which led to a lack of any impulse to develop the machine as a substitute for manual labour." Xenophon in the §Economicus held the industries in poor repute.
"Men engaged in the mechanical arts," he says, "must ever be both bad friends and feeble defenders of their country." He troubled himself little with those skilful in carpentry, metallurgy, painting, and sculpture, but was always anxious to meet a "gendeman" (o KaXo'S KayaAok). The results of this were inevitable. Classical surgery and obstetrics benefited practically nothing from the speculations of the biologists from Alcmxon to Herophilus. Surgeons and midwives remained members of the painter-cobblerbuilder group, the group of base-born mechanics, entirely distinct from the astronomer-mathematician-metaphysician-biologist group, the group familiar with courts and tyrants.
Only the greatest broke away from this tradition: Aristotle, when he conversed with fishermen; Archimedes perhaps, when he constructed his mechanical devices. For the rest, it was too strong. Down to the end of the Roman period the artillery in use remained precisely what it had been six hundred years before,; although the empire was crumbling under barbarian pressure, and would have given anything, one would imagine, for an improved artillery capable of withstanding the Gothic armies. It is strange, as has been acutely said, that the Romans never invented anything so much in the Roman taste as a railway. So far as Hellenistic empirical industrial chemistry was concerned, the Democritean and Epicurean atoms might never have existed. And in medicine, the only effect of the brilliant Greek atomic speculations was to give rise to the Methodic school of Roman physicians, described by Allbutt, whose influence was never strong, and who contributed relatively little to the main stream of therapeutics originating with Hippocrates.
In sum, we must not dissociate scientific advances from the technical needs and processes of the time, and the economic structure in which all are embedded. We shall never understand the failure of Greek science if we consider it in abstraction from the environment which sterilized its speculation. [1646] are natural philosophy, the mechanics, and husbandry, according to the principles of our new philosophical college, that values no knowledge, but as it hath a tendency to use. And therefore I shall make it one of my suits to you, that you would take the pains to enquire a little more thoroughly into the ways of husbandry etc. practised in your parts; and when you intend for England, to bring along with you what good receipts or choice books of any of these subjects you can procure; which will make you extremely welcome to our invisible college, which I had now designed to give you a description of." Fulton remarks that this statement of its aim was inadequate, but we may take leave to think it was not so inadequate as many would suppose.
If we look through the account and defence of the Royal Society published by Thomas Sprat, Bp. of Rochester, we find that he gives a series of 13 sample papers from the reports of the society to show what good it had done. Of these 13, 5 are purely technical (wine, guns, saltpetre, dyeing, oysters), 2 have to do with exploration and 3 with meteorology and anatomy, important for navigation, making a total of 10 which would be for "the improvement of husbandry." The remaining three we should now call pure "science" and were devoted 2 to chemistry and I to physiology.
paper before the Society-not, as might have been expected from his profession, on the transfusion of blood or the anatomy of the brain, but on the value and use of China Varnish. However, it is probable that for the most part the embryologists whose work we shall have to discuss were practising physicians, free or relatively free from the ancient tradition, and conscious that to understand the mystery of generation would be to advance the science and art of medicine.
In this connection it is of interest that the Church in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries provided a certain source of demand for embryological research. Of this Swammerdam and Malebranche provide interesting examples, and the conviction, then widely held, that research into the nature of generation would throw light on orthodox theological doctrines, such as that of original sin, led to an economic situation of value for biological development. Finally, it would be rash to minimize the factor of pure curiosity in seventeenth-century science. The time-killing dilettante, almost philatelic, quality of Leeuwenhoek's investigations is, as Becking says, too obvious to be overlooked.
Next comes Cooperation of Scholars. In the civilization of the Hellenistic age, it may be said, a considerable measure of such cooperation had been attained; the works of Aristotle and-Hippocrates were fairly readily available in written form, and evidence has been brought forward, particularly with regard to Jewish thought, that this was well used.
During the period when the biological school of Alexandria was at its height, that city became an important Jewish center. Two centuries later it was to produce Philo, but now the Alexandrian Jews were writing that part of the modern Bible known as the Wisdom Literature. In books such as the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Proverbs, etc., the typical Hellenic exclusion of the action of gods in natural phenomena is clearly to be seen. There are two passages of embryological importance. Firstly, in the book of Job (x, 10), Job is made to say, "Remember, I beseech thee, that thou hast fashioned me as clay; and wilt thou bring me into the dust again? Hast thou not poured me out like milk, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh, and knit me together with bones and sinews." This comparison of embryogeny with the making of cheese is interesting in view of the fact that precisely the same comparison occurs in Aristotle's book On the Generation of Animals. Still more extraordinary, the only other embryological reference in the Wisdom Literature, which occurs in the Wisdom of Solomon (vii, 2), also copies an Aristotelian theory, namely, that the embryo is formed from (menstrual) blood.
The Talmudists thought, moreover, that the bones and tendons, the nails, the marrow in the head and the white of the eye, were derived from the father, "who sows the white," but the skin, flesh, blood, hair, and the dark part of the eye from the mother "who sows the red." This is evidently in direct descent from Aristotle through Galen, and may be compared with the following passage* from the latter writer's Commentary on Hippocrates: "We teach that some parts of the body are formed from the semen and the flesh alone from blood. But because the amount of semen which is injected into the uterus is small, growth and increment must come for the most part from the blood." It might thus appear that, just as the Jews of Alexandria were reading Aristotle in the third century B. C., and incorporating him into the Wisdom Literature, so those of the third century A. D., were reading Galen and incorporating him into the Talmud.
But we must beware here of suffering a distortion of perspective in the contemplation of antiquity, for it is easy to exaggerate the cooperation of ancient thought. A single idea could consider itself lucky if it passed once in twenty-five years between Greece and India after Alexander. Among the conflicting influences that gave rise to the civilization of the later West, this cooperation, hampered by enormous linguistic difficulties on the one hand and bv the diversion of interest from scientific to ethical and theological channels on the other, sank to a very low level. Hence we have the remarkable spectacle of a Leonardo, many years ahead of his contemporaries, and able to earn a living only as a designer of fortifications, finding it impossible to communicate his discoveries to any living person, and reduced to burying them in note-books, only by a mere chance available to scholars of after ages.
Among the most important of limiting factors we must reckon Technique, extending the term to cover mental as well as material * Ten centuries later it was still worth while for Harvey to have a hit at this opinion. "In the interim," he says (1653, p. 116), "we cannot chuse but smile at that fond and fictitious Division of the Parts, into Spermatical and Sanguineous; as if any part were immediately framed of the semen, and were not all of one extract and original." methodology. The part which the latter has played in the history of embryology can hardly be overrated. Thus until the introduction of hardening agents, especially alcohol, by Boyle, the examination of the early stages of embryos was bound to remain crude, and we have seen how embryology attained an entirely different level immediately afterwards, in the hands of Maitre-Jan. The parallel case of the microscope is too familiar to dwell on, but the work of Malpighi obviously marked a turning-point in the science. It may here be noted, however, that even when methods are available, the workers of the time do not necessarily use them, and although Harvey could have employed an early form of microscope, he voluntarily restricted himself to the weak lenses, "perspicilia," or perspectives, which had already been used by Riolanus. A still more obvious instance is that of artificial incubation. Carried on in Egypt since the remotest antiquity this process must have been at the disposal of Egyptian physicians, Alexandrian biologists, and Arabian scholars for a period of three thousand years, yet so far as we know, no embryological use of it was ever made. In eighteenth-century France and England the technique of the process had to be painfully rediscovered at a time when biologists were only too eager to make use of such assistance. Let us mention, as other instances of the effect of material technique on embryology, the burst of knowledge which followed the invention of the automatic microtome by Threlfall and others about 1860, and the great advance which in our own century has followed the successful mastery of grafting technique by Spemann.
Just as important, however, as material technique is mental technique. And first with respect to words; on several occasions we have had to notice a standstill on account of the lack of a satisfactory terminology. Thus in the thirteenth century Albertus of Cologne had arrived at a point beyond which progress was impossible in the absence of new words. When, for example, there was no other means of describing the sero-amniotic junction in the hen's egg than by speaking of "the hole on the left side of the vessel which runs above the membrane on the right hand of something else" accuracy was difficult and speed impossible. A predsely similar position was occupied by Boerhaave in the eighteenth century, only now in the case of biochemical words. Faced with some substance such as a "greasy, streaky yellow oil, smelling of alkaline salt" Boerhaave was unable to describe it except in these common-sense terms, and lacking the means either to submit it to further analysis or to characterize it by accurate physico-chemical constants, he was forced to admit a vast number of ultimates into his schemes which were not ultimate at all.
Mental technique as a limiting factor in embryological history goes deeper than words, however, for it involves the concepts of the. investigator. What the Germans call "Begriffsbildung" or the construction of concepts congruent with certain sorts of natural phenomena, though never conscious in the history of biology, has none the less been operative. In this field we may remember the doctrine of Galen concerning the natural faculties (&vapukts), and the immense length of time which was required for biologists to see that it was nothing more than a concise statement of the phenomena themselves. Not until it was "seen through" as an explanation was post-Renaissance biology possible. Similarly, the peculiar contribution of Leonardo to embryology was his realization that embryos could be measured, not merely as to dimensions at one moment but as to dimensions at a succession of moments. The application of the concept of change in weight and size with time, a concept which, as modern biology shows, admits of much accuracy when properly worked out, was thus first made by Leonardo. In the same way Boyle was the first to see clearly that a problem of mixture is presented by the developing embryo (though Hippocrates had stated it dimly some two thousand years before). If the embryo is made up of mixed things, some definite proportion and way of mixture must exist. And no hope of finding out what this was could be obtained from the Aristotelian elements (heat, cold, moisture, and dryness) or from the Alchemical principles (salt, sulphur, and mercury). Hence Boyle's emphasis on the corpuscularian or mechanical hypothesis, and all its historical implications.
His preference for the "mechanical or corpuscularian" philosophy was mainly due to his realization that unless chemistry was going to start measuring something it might as well languish in the obscurity to which Harvey would willingly have relegated it. Thus he says, But I should perchance forgive the Hypothesis I have been all this time examining [that of the alchemists], if, though it reaches but to a very little part of the world, it did at least give us a satisfactory account of those things which 'tis said to teach. But I find not that it gives us any other than a very imperfect information even about mixt bodies themselves; for how will the knowledge of the Tria Prima discover to us the reason Boyle's instance of the magnetic needle pointing nearly, not exactly, at the north, and his use of the expressions "how much," "how many," "proportion," "way of mixture," indicate that he was moving towards a quantitative chemistry, and by express implication a quantitative embryology. Elsewhere he says that he thinks the Tria Prima will hardly explain a tenth part of the phenomena which the "Leucippian" or atomistic hypothesis is competent to deal with. Thus, although Boyle made few experiments or observations on embryos, he occupies a very important position in the history of embryology.
Allied to this creation of concepts, and the choice of one of them to apply, we find that the mentality of the workers of the past has often been particularly different with regard to a quality which can only be called Audacity. Probably Aristotle's greatest claim to our respect is that alone of his contemporaries and predecessors he had the audacity to suggest that animal form is not limitlessly manifold or infinite in its manifestations, but that given industry and intelligence, a classification was possible. This alone marks him out above all subsequent biologists. On a smaller scale, we find the same mental audacity in Kenelm Digby, whose discussions of the development of the chick are remarkable for their naturalistic tone,
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for their conviction that the processes of development are not beyond the reach of the reason and imagination of man. It is most ironic that Digby, who did little or nothing himself to advance our knowledge, should have spoken thus, and that his great contemporary, William Harvey, to whom we are indebted for so many advances in embryology, was led to despair of understanding development. Another interesting point that emerges from the same period is that such mental audacity can go, perhaps, too far, as when Descartes and Gassendi built up an embryology more geometrico demonstrata, in which the facts were relegated to an inferior position and the theory was all.
But not only must the right concepts be chosen, the wrong ones must be abandoned. One of the principal necessities which has faced investigators since the earliest times has been the recognition of silly questions in order to leave time for the examination of serious ones. It was presumably inevitable that the pseudo-problems concerning the entry of the soul into the embryo should be taken seriously until a very late date. But a more typical instance of a meaningless question may be found in the dispute about what parts of the egg form the chick and which feed it. The tacit assumption here was that since to common sense food and flesh are different things, there must be in the hen's egg, aside from a sufficient provision of food, some sort of pre-flesh out 'of which the embryo can be made. Not until 1651 did this pseudo-problem go out of currency in the light of Harvey's demonstration of the unsoundness of the assumption.
The expulsion of ethics from biology and embryology forms another excellent example. That good and bad, noble and ignoble, beautiful and ugly, honourable and dishonourable, are not terms with a biological meaning is a proposition which it has taken many centuries for biologists to realize.
Ideas of good and bad entered biology partly under the concept of "perfection." In 1260 Albertus was maintaining that male chicks always hatched from the more spherical eggs and female chicks from the more oval eggs, because the sphere is the most perfect of all figures in solid geometry, and the male the more perfect of the two sexes. We realize today that to ask which is the more perfect of the two sexes is a meaningless question, for we have expelled ethics from science and cannot regard any one thing as being more perfect than anything else. Again, describing the course of the arteries in the developing chick, Albertus says: "One of the two passages which springs from the heart branches into two, one of them going to the spiritual part which contains the heart, and carrying to it the pulse and subtle blood from which the lungs and other spiritual parts are formed; and the other passing through the diaphragm to enclose the yolk of the egg, around which it forms the liver and stomach." This distinction between the organs above the diaphragm,-the lungs, heart, thymus, etc.-called "spiritualia," and the organs below,-the stomach, liver, intestines, spleen, etc.-runs through the whole of the early anatomy. It was as if the organs of the thorax were regarded as a respectable family living at the top of an otherwise disreputable block of flats. To us it seems absurd to call one organ more "spiritual" than another, but that is because we realize the irrelevance of ethical issues in biology. St. Thomas Aquinas, about the same time, in his Summa Theologica dealt in passing with human generation. "The generative power of the female," he said, "is imperfect compared to that of the male, for just as in the crafts, the inferior workman prepares the material and the more skilled operator shapes it, so likewise the female generative virtue provides the substance but the active male virtue makes it into the finished product." This is really the pure Aristotelian doctrine, but St. Thomas gives it the characteristically medieval twist. Aristotle might make a distinction between form and matter in generation, but the mediaeval mind, with its perpetual hankering after value, would at once enquire which of the two, male or female, was the higher, the nobler, the more honourable.
In the eighteenth century the same frame of mind persisted. It was maintained that in every detail of the visible world some evidence could be found for the central dogma of natural religion, the belief in a just and beneficent God. Biology was thus not free from the mental bias associated with theology.* Between 1700 and 1850 a multitude of books were written which purported to reveal the wisdom and goodness of God in the natural creation. The theologians took what suited their purpose and left the rest. It is instructive to see how Goethe, who was deeply committed to the theological interpretation of phenomena, reacted to the ornithological anecdotes of his secretary Eckermann on October 18, 1827. He said little while Eckermann told him about the habits of the cuckoo and other birds, but when Eckermann related how * For a striking example of this, see Edmund Gosse's Father and Son.
he had liberated a young wren near a robin's nest and how he had found it subsequently being fed by the robins, Goethe exclaimed: "That is dne of the best ornithological stories I have ever heard. I drink success to you and your investigations. Whoever hears that, and does not believe in God, will not be aided by Moses and the prophets. That is what I call the omnipresence of the Deity, who has everywhere spread and implanted a portion of His endless love." And so it always was with the theological naturalists; they hailed with enthusiasm the discovery of monogamy in tortoises, or mother-love in goats, but they had nothing to say concerning the habits of the hookworm parasite or the appearance of embryonic monsters in man. Not until the beginning of the nineteenth century did it become clear that nature cannot be divided into the Edifying, which may with pleasure be published, and the Unedifying, which must be kept in obscurity.
In the end we may say that the progress of a branch of natural science such as embryology depends on a delicate balance of three things; speculative thought, accurate observation, and controlled experiment. Any modification of the optimum balance will act as a powerful limiting factor on progress. Speculative thought, in particular, has shown a tendency to crystallize too-readily into doctrines which, by way of attachment to some philosophical or theological issue, live a longer life than they deserve. Thus the Aristotelian theory of the formation of the embryo by the coagulation of the menstrual blood, built in the first instance upon a faulty deduction, became incorporated in the Aristotelian tradition of forma and materia, and although quite repugnant to observation, remained the official theory throughout the European middle ages, and apparently in perpetuity in India. So powerful was the rationalism of a medical education at about 1630 that the physicians to whom Harvey demonstrated the empty uteri of the King's does preferred to believe their books rather than the evidence of their senses.
The account given by Harvey himself (1653, p. 416) cannot be omitted:
When I had often discovered to His Majesties sight this alteration in the Womb, and having likewise plainly shewed that all this while no portion of seed or conception either was to be found in the Womb, and when the King himself had communicated the same as a very wonderful thing to diverse of his followers, a great debate at length arose: The Keepers and Huntsmen concluded, first, that this did imply, that their conception would be late that year, and thereupon accused the drought; but afterwards when they understood that the rutting time was past and gone; and that I stood stiffly upon that, they peremptorily did affirm, that I was first mistaken my selfe, and so had drawn the King into my error; and that it could not possibly be, but that something at lest of the Conception must needs appear in the Uterus: untill at last, being confuted by their own eyes, they sate down in a gaze and gave it over for granted. But all the Kings Physitians persisted stiffly, that it could no waies be, that a conception should go forward unless the males seed did remain in the womb, and that there should be nothing at all residing in the Uterus after a fruitfull and effectuall Coition; this they ranked amongst their a8V'vaTa.
Now that this experiment which is of so great concern might appear the more evident to posterity; His Majestie for tryal-sake (because they have all the same time and manner of conception) did at the beginning of October separate about a dozen Does from the society of the Buck and lock them up in the Course neer Hampton Court. Now lest any one might affirm that doubtlessly there did continue the seed bestowed upon them in Coition (their time of Rutting being then not past) I dissected diverse of them, and discovered no seed at all residing in their Uterus; and yet those whom I dissected not, did conceive by the virtue of their former Coition (as by Contagion) and did Fawn at their appointed time.
And precisely parallel to this attitude was that of the preformationists in the following century, who, having decided, like Bonnet, that epigenesis was inconceivable, only accepted such observations as confirmed their a priori view.
Preformationism as a manifestation of rationality merits further examination. The dogmatic manner in which preformationism was held during the eighteenth century would not perhaps have been so crushing if the biologists of that time had been able to take a mathematical argument more seriously. There was Harvey's very convincing argument about the circulation of the blood, and Freind's equally convincing, but unfortunately erroneous, argument about the quantity of menstrual blood and the weight of the newborn faetus. Verbally, it was still quite possible to support the Hellenistic view that the embryo was formed from menstrual blood, in the post-Harveian period, if it were admitted that this blood flowed little by little through the umbilical vessels. This was the position of John Freind in his treatise on menstruation, Emmenologia (1700-30). Calculating the amount evacuated in nine months, he said: "The quantity of Blood which the Mother may bestow upon the is nourishment of her Offspring will be lib. 13 32Y3, which will outweigh the new-born Foetus with all its Integuments, if they should be put into a Balance; and leave no room to doubt, its being able to bestow very proper nourishment on the Embrio. For the mean weight of a new-born Foetus is about 12 lib., sometimes it is found greater, and very often less."
If these could have been accepted, it was a pity that Hartsoeker's argument about preformation could not. In 1722 Hartsoeker calculated that 1 0100°0 rabbits must have existed in the first rabbit, assuming that the creation took place 6000 years ago and that rabbits begin to reproduce their kind at the age of six months. But to this Bonnet merely answered that it was always possible, by adding zeros to units, to crush the imagination under the weight of numbers, and he described the preformation theory as one of the most striking victories of the understanding over the senses. It would have been better described as one of the most striking victories of the imagination over the understanding.
The fact is that the biologists of the eighteenth century, carried away by preformationist theory, took embryology on to a plane where observation became superfluous. They would have found acceptable the sentiment satirized by Boyle that "it is-much more high and philosophical to argue a priori than a posteriori," and were eventually debarred from looking at developing embryos by their conviction that structure and organization would certainly be there, whether they could see it or not. The preformationist controversy was, in fact, a repetition in biology of the controversy between the rationalists and the empiricists in philosophy. The contemporary rationalists were people who held that "human beings were in possession of certain principles of interpretation which were not simply generalisations from experience, but could nevertheless be used as major premises in arguments concerning nature. If observations were not in accordance with expectations founded on such reasoning, they were dismissed as illusions. The empiricists, on the other hand, held that there was no knowledge independent of observation, and that the rationalists' principles, in so far as they were admissible at all, were generalisations from experience." It is obvious that nearly all the preformationists were rationalists. They thought that Reason was in a position to decide the issue whatever might be the results of observation. "It is remarkable," as Cole says, in his book on this period, "that the preformationists did not realise that if the point to be established is assumed at the outset all further discussion is superfluous." In this example, then, we have a disturbance of the balance towards the side of rationalistic speculation.
It would be a mistake, however, to regard this tendency as confined to the eighteenth century. Ample examples of its presence can be collected from nearly every period in biological history. "We plume ourselves," says Cole, "on that aspect of our work which is vain and argumentative, and condescend to the more modest but enduring labour of observation." There can be no doubt that this state of affairs, so unfortunate for science, is one aspect of that contempt for manual labour which has run through the stratified structures of all societies in the history of civilization. The manipulator of paper and ink, educated in the classical traditions of his time, has always seemed, by reason of his superficial similarity to the political administrator, a superior being to the empirical mechanic engaged in the manual work of the arts and industries. The tradition is as old as civilization, yet for the advance of science it must be broken. Not until the manual worker and the audacious theorist are combined in one person will the fullest development of scientific thought be possible.
When I once gave some lectures on this subject at University College, London, they bore the title "Speculation, Observation and Experiment as Illustrated by the History of Embryology." Of the first two of these factors we have seen enough, but the third would have necessitated the continuation of the story down to the end of the nineteenth century, and this has still only the status of a projected second volume. The true science of experimental embryology did not come into being until the time of Wilhelm Roux. The early chemical observations on the embryonic liquors were indeed observations rather than experiments; and there was no systematic study of the changes which the liquors undergo during the development of the fcetus; this was not done till the time of John Dzondi (1806). Harvey's segregation of does at Hampton Court merits, no doubt, the name of experiment, involving as it did the use of "controls," and an outstanding instance is the ligature of Nuck in 1691. The work of Nuck in 1691 is very important, as one of the earliest instances of experimental procedure. He ligatured the uterine horns after copulation in a dog, and observed preg-nancy afterwards, implantation having taken place above the ligature. His conclusion was that the embryo was derived from the ovary and not from the sperm-"animal ex ovo generari experimento probatur."
As in Nuck's case, experiment in the hands of both Spallanzani and J. T. Needham led to error. Spallanzani confuted his adversary on the question of spontaneous generation and the vegetative force by what amounted to rigid criticism of experimental conditions, but later on denied their proper function to the spermatozoa on exactly the same methodologically faulty grounds.
Nevertheless, experimentation, the active interference with the course of nature and the subsequent observation of the resulting system in comparison with systems in which no such interference has taken place, was a characteristically nineteenth-century product as far as biology and embryology are concerned. Only at the present day, indeed, are we beginning to appreciate the statistical and other difficulties attending upon the full application of the experimental method to living organisms, and the manifold obstacles which prevent obedience to the rule that only one variable be modified at one time. But this is no matter of reproach against the older embryologists. Knowledge of form must necessarily precede knowledge of change of form and the factors producing it, and so we see during the last seventy years the production of "Normaltafeln" or tables of morphological pictures showing normal development; these are the essential basis for experimental studies.
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that a plethora of observation and experiment is also bad for scientific progress. Modern biology is the crowning instance of this fact. What has been well called a "medley of ad hoc hypotheses" is all that we have to show as the theoretical background of a vast and constantly increasing mass of observations and experiments. Embrvology in particular has been theoretically threadbare, since the decay of the evolution theory as a mode of explanation. Embryologists of the school of F. M. Balfour thought that their task was accomplished when they had traced a maximum number of evolutionary analogies in the development of an animal. Wilhelm His, perhaps the first causal embryologist, struggled successfully to end this state of affairs. "My own attempts," he wrote in 1888 in a famous passage, "to introduce some elementary physiological or mechanical explanations into embryology have not been generally agreed to by morphologists. To one it seemed ridiculous to speak of the elasticity of the germinal layers; another thought that by such considerations we put the cart before the horse; and one recent author states that we have something better to do in embryology than to discuss tensions of germinal layers, etc., since all embryological explanation must necessarily be of a phylogenetic nature." But this strictly evolutionary dominance in embryology did not last on into the twentieth century. The unfortunate thing is that nothing has so far been devised to put in its place. Experimental embryology, Morphological embryology, Physiological embryology, and Chemical embryology form today a vast range of factual knowledge, without one single unifying hypothesis, for we cannot dignify the axial gradient doctrines, the field theories, and the speculations on the genetic control of enzymes, with such a position. We cannot doubt that the most urgent need of modern embryology is a series of advances of a purely theoretical, even mathematico-logical, nature. Only by something of this kind can we redress the balance which has fallen over to observation and experiment; only by some such effort can we obtain a theoretical embryology suited in magnitude and spaciousness to the wealth of facts which contemporary investigators are accumulating day by day.
